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Abstract Why do individuals mentally modify reality (e.g.,
BIf it hadn’t rained, we would have won the game^)?
According to the dominant view, counterfactuals primarily
serve to prepare future performance. In fact, individuals who
have just failed a task tend to modify the uncontrollable fea-
tures of their attempt (e.g., BIf the rules of the game were
different, I would have won it^), generating counterfactuals
that are unlikely to play any preparatory role. By contrast, they
generate prefactuals that focus on the controllable features of
their ensuing behavior (e.g., BIf I concentrate more, I will win
the next game^). Here, we test whether this tendency is robust
and general. Studies 1a and 1b replicate this tendency and
show that it occurs regardless of whether individuals think
about their failures or their successes. Study 2 shows that
individuals generate relatively few controllable counterfac-
tuals, unless explicitly prompted to do so. These results raise
some questions regarding the generality of the dominant view
according to which counterfactuals mainly serve a preparatory
function.
Keywords Counterfactuals . Preparatory hypothesis .
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Individuals often mentally modify everyday occurrences (e.g.,
BIf it hadn’t rained, we would have won the game^), historical
events (e.g., BIf it hadn’t rained during the night of Waterloo,
the future of Europe would have been different^), and even
fiction (e.g., BIf it hadn’t rained the night of the concert, maybe
the protagonist of Joyce’s BAMother^ would not have ruined
her daughter’s career^). That is, individuals often think
counterfactually (for a recent review, see Byrne, 2016). Why
do they do it?
Although several functions have been suggested for the
ability to produce counterfactual thoughts (see Byrne, 2016),
the main hypothesis that purports to answer this question has
been dubbed the preparatory theory. It states that Bthe primary
function of counterfactual thinking centers on the manage-
ment and coordination of ongoing behavior. Thinking about
what might have been influences performance and facilitates
improvement.^ Accordingly, BCounterfactual thoughts are
typically activated by a failed goal, and they specify what
one might have done to have achieved that goal^ (Epstude
& Roese, 2008, pp. 169–170; see also Epstude & Roese,
2011; Kray, Galinsky, & Markman, 2009; Markman,
Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993; Roese, 1997). This
prediction of the preparatory hypothesis is intuitively compel-
ling. Indeed, if counterfactuals essentially serve to regulate
behavior and improve performance, the typical condition in
which they are produced should be a failure, and their typical
content should be something that the agent of the failure might
have done to avoid it and will not do again in similar future
endeavors. Is this prediction empirically supported?
As for the conditions that typically elicit counterfactual
thoughts, evidence exists that individuals tend to produce more
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counterfactuals after a failure than after a success (e.g., Roese&
Hur, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995). As for the content of coun-
terfactuals, the evidence is mixed. According to the preparatory
hypothesis, individuals who think about their failures should
generate relatively more modifications focusing on what they
might have done (e.g., BIf I had used a different strategy, I
would have won the game^) than modifications focusing on
how the circumstances might have been different (e.g., “If the
rules of the gamewere different, I would have won it”). In other
words, they should produce controllable counterfactuals more
often than uncontrollable ones. Here, we define controllable
counterfactuals as counterfactuals that refer to factors that are
under the participant’s control, that is, factors that the partici-
pant could modify to improve performance in the next iteration
of the task. Uncontrollable counterfactuals are defined as coun-
terfactuals that refer to factors that are not under the partici-
pant’s control, and thus could not be modified to improve per-
formance in the next iteration of the task.
By this definition, it is clear that only controllable counter-
factuals can play a useful preparatory role (e.g., individuals
can try using a different strategy in the next attempt, but they
cannot change the rules of the game).When individuals read a
scenario about a protagonist who fails to reach her goal, they
behave as predicted by the preparatory hypothesis: They mod-
ify the elements of the scenario that were under the protago-
nist’s control rather than uncontrollable aspects of reality (e.g.,
Girotto, Legrenzi, & Rizzo, 1991; McCloy & Byrne, 2000).
However, scenario readers do not have the opportunity to
think about failures that happened to them. And so their coun-
terfactuals do not obviously serve the primary purpose of im-
proving their own future performance. In fact, if one wants to
provide a direct test of the preparatory hypothesis’ predictions,
one should investigate counterfactual thinking in individuals
who have just experienced an actual failure. Evidence pres-
ently reviewed suggests that, unlike scenario readers, these
individuals generate counterfactuals that are not easily recon-
ciled with the preparatory hypothesis.
In a series of studies, participants were asked to solve a task
(e.g., a mathematical puzzle) and, if they failed to solve it, to
think about how things could have been better for them
(Girotto, Ferrante, Pighin, & Gonzalez, 2007; Pighin, Byrne,
Ferrante, Gonzalez, & Girotto, 2011). Contrary to the prepa-
ratory hypothesis’ prediction, these participants modified the
uncontrollable features that had constrained their failed at-
tempt, including their permanent traits (e.g., BIf I had better
mathematical abilities…^) and the rules of the game (e.g., BIf I
had been able to use some paper and a pencil…^), rather than
the features that were under their control, like the strategy they
used (e.g., BIf I had started by multiplying the tens…^) and
their attention and concentration level (e.g., BIf I had concen-
trated better…^).
Studying the hypothetical thoughts of individuals who
have recently experienced a failure allows one to test a further
prediction of the preparatory hypothesis: If counterfactual
thinking is primarily aimed at improving the future, then when
controllable alternatives are available, people should tend to
use them. Our prefactual condition provides a good test of the
availability of controllable alternatives and, therefore, if the
preparatory theory is correct, people should focus on control-
lable events to a similar extent in the counterfactual and
prefactual conditions. This prediction is clearly made in a
recent article defending the preparatory function of
counterfactuals:
To the extent that an action fails to yield the desired and
expected outcome, counterfactuals are activated relative-
ly automatically and center on alternative actions that
might well have brought about the desired outcome
(Epstude & Roese, 2011). Action phases situate within
a regulatory loop, such that failed goal pursuit loops from
the postactional phase back to a new instantiation of the
predecisional phase. Prefactuals may then become part of
the predecisional phase and feed into the formation of a
decision (which goal to pursue) and intention (how to
pursue that goal) (Epstude, Scholl, &Roese, 2016, p. 49).
In other words, given the same experienced failure, imag-
ining a better past should not differ from imagining a better
future. Ferrante, Girotto, Stragà, and Walsh (2013) compared
the number of thoughts participants generated that focused on
controllable features of a task (e.g., how much the participant
concentrates on the task) and uncontrollable features of a task
(e.g., the imparted time to complete it). Among participants
who had just failed a task, those who were asked to produce
counterfactual thoughts (i.e., BThings would have been better
if…^), tended to produce significantly fewer controllable
thoughts (43 %) than those who were asked to produce
prefactual thoughts (i.e., BThings will be better for me in the
next game if…^; 78%). In sum, compared to prefactual think-
ing, counterfactual thinking seems less likely to fulfill prepa-
ratory goals. Taken together, these and other results (e.g.,
McCrea, 2008; Petrocelli & Harris, 2011), which were obtain-
ed for different tasks and conditions, seriously challenge the
preparatory hypothesis, suggesting that the primary function
of counterfactuals may be other than the preparatory one.
The goal of this article is twofold. The first goal is to pro-
vide more evidence that the relative lack of controllable coun-
terfactual thoughts, compared to prefactual thoughts, is robust.
Studies 1a and 1b aim to replicate and generalize the experi-
ments documenting that actual failures do not elicit controlla-
ble counterfactuals.Whereas previous studies have investigat-
ed only upward counterfactuals, that is, hypothetical thoughts
about how things could have been better, Studies 1a and 1b
also investigated downward counterfactuals, that is, hypothet-
ical thoughts about how things could have been worse.
According to the preparatory hypothesis, downward
262 Mem Cogn (2017) 45:261–269
counterfactuals may also serve a preparatory function: In
some cases, Bdownward counterfactual thinking (‘I feel bad
when I focus on how I might have done worse’) motivated
participants to try harder on a subsequent […] task^ (Epstude
& Roese, 2008, p. 176). It is thus important to test whether or
not individuals also tend to produce uncontrollable downward
counterfactuals.
The second goal of this article is to test an implicit predic-
tion of the preparatory hypothesis. If the main function of
counterfactual thinking is to prepare individuals for better per-
formance, individuals who have experienced a failure should
produce counterfactuals of the controllable sort whether or not
they are explicitly prompted to generate useful thoughts.
Contrary to this prediction, we posit that generating counter-
factuals with the explicit aim of improving future performance
is close to generating prefactuals: In both cases, individuals
cannot focus on features that could not change in the future.
Accordingly, in both cases individuals should produce con-
trollable alternatives more often than when they receive the
standard instruction to generate counterfactuals. To test these
diverging possibilities, we compared the hypothetical
thoughts of participants who had just failed a task and who
received the standard generic request to imagine some modi-
fications with those of participants who received a specific
request to imagine modifications that would be useful for their
own or other individuals’ future performance on a similar task.
Study 1a
The aim of Studies 1a and 1b was to establish whether indi-
viduals tend to generate relatively more controllable modifi-
cations when they create prefactuals than when they create
counterfactuals, regardless of the direction of their thoughts
(i.e., upward vs. downward). In Study 1a, individuals who had
just failed or succeeded in solving a task were required to
imagine better or worse modifications in an ensuing endeavor
or in the past attempt.
Method
Participants
One hundred twenty-six undergraduate students (71 female;
mean age = 24 years)1 from the University IUAV of Venice
participated in exchange for raffle tickets to win photocopy
cards.
Materials and procedure
After providing informed consent, participants sat in front of a
personal computer to complete a computer-based word-search
puzzle. It was explained to them that the purpose of the game
was to find as many words as possible in an 11 × 11 letter grid.
Participants were shown a labeled screen shot of an example
grid with accompanying instructions. The instructions ex-
plained that the hidden words could appear in any direction
(vertical, horizontal, or diagonal) and that some letters may
belong to more than one word. Participants typed the words
into an empty box that appeared below the grid. If an entered
word was one of the hidden words in the grid, then clicking an
BOK^ button added the word to a list of discovered words that
appeared to the right of the grid. A timer appeared below the
list of discovered words, which showed the time remaining.
Further instructions explained the rules of the puzzle game:
that all words must be in Italian, contain five or more letters,
and be common nouns (i.e., not adjectives, verbs, or proper
names). Points were awarded according to the orientation of
the words in the grid, such that vertical words earned more
points than horizontal ones, words with letters in reverse order
earned more points than ones in the normal order, and diago-
nal words earned more points than horizontal and vertical
words. Participants were given 3 minutes to find as many
words as possible. They were informed that their performance
on the task would determine whether they received 20 or 60
raffle tickets to win photocopy cards (value of each card = 1€,
about $1.10). Independent of their performance, the number
of tickets participants received was determined by whether
they had been randomly assigned to a success (n = 63; win-
ning 60 tickets) or failure (n = 63; winning 20 tickets)
condition.
After the task and following the provision of failure or
success feedback (i.e., participants were told that their score
was below or above the reference score and, as a consequence,
they won 20 or 60 tickets, respectively), participants were
informed that they would shortly complete a similar word-
search puzzle and were first asked to think about their perfor-
mance. They were randomly assigned to a counterfactual or a
prefactual condition following their previous failure (counter-
factual, n = 32; prefactual, n = 31) or success (counterfactual,
n = 33; prefactual, n = 30). Those who received failure feed-
back were given the following instructions (text in brackets
refers to the prefactual condition): BThings would have been
better for me [Things will be better for me in the next game],
if…Please, write at least one way in which you would com-
plete this sentence.^ Those who received success feedback
were given the following instructions (text in brackets refers
to the prefactual condition): BThings would have been worse
for me [Things will be worse for me in the next game], if…
Please, write at least one way in which you would complete
this sentence.^
1 One of our aims was to replicate Ferrante et al.’s (2013) studies, whose
group size ranged between about 40 (Experiment 1) and 30 (Experiment
2) respondents. Accordingly, we have tested about 30 respondents per
group in Study 1a, and about 40 respondents per group in Study 1b and
Study 2.
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Results
Responses to the counterfactual/prefactual sentences included
modifications of the characteristics of the task (e.g., BIf I had
more time^/BIf the problem is easier^), the participants’ psy-
chophysical status (e.g., BIf I had slept more^/none given),
their stable traits (e.g., BIf I were good at this sort of game^/
BIf my verbal intelligence was trained^), the traits that they
could not improve before the following task (e.g., BIf I had
trained more in this sort of quiz^/BIf I can train^), and contex-
tual factors (e.g., BIf I had an exam later^/BIf something dis-
tracts me^). These responses were coded as uncontrollable
modifications (see the Supplementary Materials for an
alternative classification). Other responses included alter-
ations to participants’ strategic approach (e.g., BIf I had used
a better strategy^/BIf I use a different tactic^), and their level of
attention and concentration (e.g., “If I had paid more atten-
tion”/BIf I concentrate better^). These responses were coded
as controllable modifications. Two independent judges, un-
aware of the hypotheses, classified the responses. Their agree-
ment rate was 91%, Cohen’s k = .83, p < .001. Disagreements
were resolved by discussion. We discarded the data of five
participants because the response they gave was ambiguous
or noninformative (three participants in the success counter-
factual and one in the failure prefactual condition) or because
they failed to complete the task (one participant in the failure
prefactual condition). The remaining participants were distrib-
uted as follows: failure prefactual, n = 30; failure counterfac-
tual, n = 31; success prefactual, n = 30; success counterfactual,
n = 30.
Participants discovered on average 7.06 words (min = 1,
max = 14) in the word-search task. A two-way between-sub-
jects analysis of variance showed that the number of discov-
ered words did not differ in the success (M = 7.02, SD = 2.30)
versus failure (M = 7.10, SD = 2.58), F(1, 117) = 0.04, p = .85,
conditions, nor in the counterfactual (M = 7.10, SD = 2.51)
versus prefactual (M = 7.02, SD = 2.38), F(1, 117) = 0.04, p =
.85, conditions.
The four conditions elicited a similar mean number of mod-
ifications (see Table 1). In all studies, we report the analyses of
the first responses generated on the hypothetical thinking task
and of all responses elicited in each condition (i.e., proportion
of controllable modifications on all the modifications gener-
ated by each participant). Following failure, respondents gen-
erated significantly more controllable thoughts in the
prefactual condition than in the counterfactual one, both when
we considered the first modifications, (77 % vs. 35 %, respec-
tively), χ2(1, N = 61) = 10.48, p = .001, φ = .41, and all the
modifications (78 % vs. 33 %, respectively), Mann–Whitney
U = 226.5, p < .001, r = .48 (see Table 1). Likewise, following
success, respondents produced significantly more controllable
thoughts in the prefactual condition than in the counterfactual
one, both when we considered the first modifications (60 %
vs. 20 %, respectively), χ2(1, N = 60) = 10.0, p = .002, φ =
.41, and all the modifications (52 % vs. 24 %, respectively),
Mann–Whitney U = 263.5, p = .002, r = .40.2
Moreover, in each condition, most response patterns were
consistent—that is, they contained only uncontrollable or only
controllable mutations (failure prefactual: 87 %; failure coun-
terfactual: 81 %; success prefactual: 77 %; success counter-
factual: 93 %).
These results replicate the results obtained when partici-
pants reflected on their failures in Ferrante et al. (2013), and
extend them to situations in which participants reflect on their
successes. In both cases, participants tend to produce more
uncontrollable modifications when they generate counterfac-
tuals and more controllable modifications when they generate
prefactuals. Only a third of the counterfactuals generated were
controllable, a result that would not be predicted if counter-
factuals had a preparatory function. Furthermore, individuals
knew that they were about to receive another similar task to
do, and so their motivation to think of how they could improve
should be strong (see Markman et al., 1993). Yet participants
spontaneously produced few controllable counterfactuals.
Study 1b
In Study 1a, participants received feedback that was unrelated
to their actual performance. Thus, for some participants the
feedback might have seemed out of touch with their perfor-
mance. This possibility opens the question of whether the
reported difference in the generation of future versus past
modifications might also occur when participants are given
accurate feedback on their past performance. To answer this
question, in Study 1b participants were required to produce
modifications about their own actual performance on a given
Table 1 Mean number of modifications and the percentage of first and
all modifications that were controllable in the four conditions of Studies
1a and 1b
Condition Study 1a Study 1b
Mean (SD) First All Mean (SD) First All
Failure Prefactual 1.80 (0.76) 77 78 1.09 (0.34) 61 58
Counterfactual 1.74 (0.63) 35 33 1.29 (0.58) 9 8
Success Prefactual 1.80 (0.85) 60 52 1.48 (0.57) 45 43
Counterfactual 1.97 (0.85) 20 24 2.07 (0.77) 11 16
2 The minor difference in the framing of the counterfactual and prefactual
question could have focused the prefactual question (BThings will be
better for me in the next game if^) more on the task and the counterfactual
question (BThings would have been better for me if^) more on the par-
ticipant’s experience. However, we found that even in the counterfactual
condition, most thoughts focused on the task. Hence, this potential con-
found is unlikely to have substantially affected the results.
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task. A secondary aim of Study 1b was to generalize the re-
sults of Study 1a using a different type of task (a syllogistic
task rather than a word-search game) and a different popula-
tion (online survey respondents rather than undergraduates).
Method
Participants
Participants were 199 U.S. residents (mean age: 30 years; age
range: 18–67 years; 71 women) recruited using the Amazon
Mechanical Turk platform. They were paid $1 to complete a
syllogistic task in a limited time.
Materials and procedure
The task asked the participants to order five individuals by
height on the basis of four statements describing the height
relations between pairs of individuals (e.g. BMatt is shorter
than Paul^; see Supplemental Materials for details). An exam-
ple was provided, and the participants had to complete a sim-
ple task to learn how to use the interface to order the individ-
uals. Once they had completed this trivial task, participants
were reminded of how the actual task would work, and that
they would only have 20 seconds to complete it. After the
task, participants were provided with accurate failure or suc-
cess feedback (i.e. depending on whether they solved the task
in the allotted time) and were asked to think about their per-
formance. Participants were randomly assigned to a counter-
factual or prefactual condition following their failure
(prefactual, n = 64; counterfactual, n = 68) or success
(prefactual, n = 36; counterfactual, n = 31). In the prefactual
condition, they were informed that they would shortly com-
plete another similar syllogistic task. They were given the
same instructions as in the corresponding conditions of
Study 1a.
Results
The responses were similar to those obtained in Study 1a, and
were coded by two independent judges, blind to the hypothe-
ses, who used the same coding criterion as in Study 1a. Their
agreement rate was 94 %, Cohen’s k = .87, p < .001.
Disagreements were resolved by discussion. We discarded
the data of six participants who failed to complete the task
and 10 participants who produced only ambiguous responses.
The remaining participants were distributed as follows: failure
prefactual, n = 57, failure counterfactual, n = 65, success
prefactual, n = 33, success counterfactual, n = 28.
Participants generated a significantly higher number of
modifications in the success conditions (M = 1.75, SD =
0.72) than in the failure conditions (M = 1.20, SD = 0.49),
F(1, 179) = 46.26, p < .001, p
2 = .21 (see Table 1).Moreover,
in the success conditions, they generated a significantly higher
number of counterfactual (M = 2.07, SD = 0.77) than
prefactual modifications (M = 1.48, SD = 0.57), F(1, 179) =
4.88, p = .03, p
2 = .03. We have no plausible explanation for
these differences. They did not emerge in the other two studies
(see Tables 1 and 2).
After a failure, the prefactual condition elicited significant-
ly more controllable modifications than did the counterfactual
condition, both when we considered the first modifications
(61 % vs. 9 %, respectively), χ2(1, N = 122) = 37.05, p <
.001, φ = .55, and all modifications (58 % vs. 8 %, respec-
tively), Mann–Whitney U = 864.0, p < .001, r = .55 (see
Table 1). Likewise, after a success, the prefactual condition
elicited significantly more controllable modifications than did
the counterfactual condition, both when we considered the
first modifications (45 % vs. 11 %, respectively), χ2(1, N =
61) = 8.79, p = .003, φ = .38, and all modifications (43 % vs.
16 %, respectively), Mann–Whitney U = 287.5, p = .003, r =
.38. Failure and success feedback elicited a similar rate of
controllable counterfactuals, both when we considered the
first modifications (9 % vs. 11 %, respectively), χ2(1, N =
93) = 0.05, p = .82, φ = .02, and all modifications (8 % vs.
16 %, respectively), Mann–Whitney U = 850.5, p = .39, r =
.09. Likewise, the two sorts of feedback elicited a similar rate
of controllable prefactuals, both when we considered the first
modifications (61 % vs. 45 % of controllable modifications,
respectively), χ2(1, N = 90) = 2.15, p = .14, φ = .15, and all
modifications (58 % vs. 43 %, respectively), Mann–Whitney
U = 766.0, p = .10, r = .17.
As in Study 1a, most response patterns were consistent
both in the failure (prefactual = 98 %; counterfactual =
95 %) and success (prefactual = 85 %; counterfactual =
86 %) conditions.
Study 1b replicates the findings of Study 1a. Participants
generated more controllable modifications in the prefactual
condition than in the counterfactual condition. They did so
both when they had successfully solved the task and when
they had failed it. The very low rate of controllable counter-
factuals (12 % across conditions) clearly conflicts with the
predictions of the preparatory hypothesis.
Study 2
Following the preparatory hypothesis, individuals who have
experienced a failure should generate controllable counterfac-
tuals regardless of whether they are explicitly prompted to do
so. The results reported by Ferrante et al. (2013) as well as
those obtained in Studies 1a and 1b suggest a different predic-
tion. Individuals who have experienced a failure are not likely
to generate controllable counterfactuals. Controllable
thoughts, however, are available to these individuals, as
proved by their tendency to generate controllable prefactuals.
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What if these individuals are explicitly required to generate
counterfactuals that could be useful for their own or other
individuals’ future performance on a similar task? Their situ-
ation is close to the one of individuals who must generate
prefactuals: They cannot focus on the constraints that have
governed their past attempt (e.g., the rules of the task) because
these features will not change in the following attempt. Hence,
they should focus on controllable features (e.g., the strategy
they used in their past attempt). In sum, individuals who have
to generate counterfactuals that could be useful in an ensuing
endeavor should generate controllable thoughts more often
than individuals who receive the standard instruction to gen-
erate counterfactuals.
In Study 2, we tested these diverging predictions by com-
paring the hypothetical thoughts of participants who had just
failed a task and who received four different sorts of instruc-
tions. In two conditions, they received the standard instruc-
tions to produce counterfactual or prefactual modifications. In
two other conditions, they were requested to generate coun-
terfactual modifications that would be useful for their own or
other individuals’ future performance on a similar task. If the
main function of counterfactual thinking were to improve fu-
ture performance, then participants should produce similar
modifications in the four conditions. In particular, they should
produce a similar rate of controllable counterfactuals when
they are asked to give a piece of advice (to themselves or to
other individuals) and when they receive no explicit instruc-
tion to this effect. By contrast, if the main function of coun-
terfactual thinking is not a preparatory one, then participants
should produce a higher rate of controllable thoughts in the
prefactual and in the advice conditions than in the standard
counterfactual one.
Method
Participants
A sample of 181 U.S. residents (mean age: 30 years; age
range: 18–61 years; 51 women) was recruited using Amazon
Mechanical Turk. They were paid $1 to complete the
syllogistic task introduced in Study 2 and to complete a hy-
pothetical sentence.
Materials and procedure
The method was similar to that of Study 1b (see Supplemental
Materials for details). Participants were randomly assigned to
one of four conditions: prefactual, n = 43; counterfactual ad-
vice–self, n = 46; counterfactual advice–other, n = 43; and
counterfactual, n = 49. They were asked to solve a syllogistic
task. Study 2 differs from Study 1b in the following ways: (1)
Participants only had 15 s (in contrast with 20 s) to complete
the task. This change guaranteed that most participants would
fail because we were only interested in modifications follow-
ing failures. (2) Accordingly, we did not ask the few partici-
pants who succeeded to produce any modifications. (3) In
addition to the prefactual and counterfactual conditions, par-
ticipants could also be prompted to produce counterfactual
thoughts that would help them improve their performance on
a repetition of the task (counterfactual advice–self condition),
or that would help another participant improve his or her per-
formance on the same task (see Supplemental Materials for
details of the requests).
Results
Participants successfully completed the task at similar rates
across conditions (prefactual = 23 %; counterfactual advice–
self = 15 %; counterfactual advice–other- = 25 %; counterfac-
tual = 18 %). The participants who succeeded were not asked
to produce a statement. The statements of those who had failed
were coded by two independent judges, blind to the hypothe-
ses. Their agreement rate was 93.6 %, Cohen’s k = .88, p <
.001. Disagreements were resolved by discussion. We
discarded the data of four respondents in the prefactual con-
dition and one respondent in the advice–other condition be-
cause the only response each one produced was ambiguous.
The remaining participants were distributed as follows:
prefactual, n = 29; counterfactual advice–self, n = 39; coun-
terfactual advice–other, n = 31; counterfactual, n = 40.
Participants generated a similar mean number of modifica-
tions across conditions (see Table 2). The advice–self and
advice–other counterfactual conditions elicited similar rates
of controllable modifications both when we considered the
first modifications (72 % vs. 68 %, respectively), χ2(1, N =
70) = 0.14, p = .71, φ = .04, and all modifications (69 % vs.
60 %, respectively), Mann–Whitney U = 595.5, p = .90, r =
.02 (see Table 2). Likewise, rates of controllable modifications
in the two advice conditions did not differ significantly from
prefactual ones: self-advice versus prefactual first modifica-
tions (72 % vs. 79 %, respectively), χ2(1, N = 68) = 0.50, p =
.48, φ = .09, all modifications (69 % vs. 80 %, respectively),
Mann–Whitney U = 488.5, p = .23, r = .14; other-advice
Table 2 Mean number of modifications, and the percentages of first
and all modifications that were controllable in the four conditions of
Study 2
Condition Mean (SD) Percentage
First All
Prefactual 1.38 (.68) 79 80
Counterfactual advice–self 1.56 (.88) 72 69
Counterfactual advice–other 1.45 (.81) 68 60
Counterfactual 1.23 (.48) 15 12
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versus prefactual first modifications (68 % vs. 79 %, respec-
tively), χ2(1, N = 60) = 1.03, p = .31, φ = .13, all modifica-
tions (60 % vs. 80 %, respectively), Mann–Whitney U =
398.5, p = .33, r = .13.
By contrast, the prefactual condition elicited a significantly
higher rate of controllable modifications than the counterfactual
condition both when we considered the first modifications
(79 % vs. 15 %, respectively), χ2(1, N = 69) = 28.54, p <
.001, φ = .64, and all modifications (80 % vs. 12 %, respec-
tively), Mann–Whitney U = 178.5, p < .001, r = .68. Similarly,
both advice conditions elicited a significantly higher rate of
controllable modifications compared to the counterfactual con-
dition: self-advice versus counterfactual first modifications
(72 % vs. 15 %, respectively), χ2(1, N = 79) = 25.98, p <
.001, φ = .57, all modifications (69 % vs. 12 %, respectively),
Mann–Whitney U = 297.0, p < .001, r = .60; other-advice
versus counterfactual first modifications (68 % vs. 15 %, re-
spectively), χ2(1, N = 71) = 20.61, p < .001, φ = .54, all
modifications (60 % vs. 12 %, respectively) Mann–Whitney
U = 248.0, p < .001, r = .59. In all conditions, most response
patterns were consistent (prefactual = 97 %; counterfactual ad-
vice–self = 87 %; counterfactual advice–other = 94 %; coun-
terfactual = 98 %).3
As predicted, we found that participants generated many
more controllable modifications not only when asked for
prefactuals but also when asked to generate counterfactuals
that could be useful for their future selves or for others. This
finding suggests that the failure of participants to generate
such controllable modifications in the counterfactual condi-
tion does not stem from a difficulty in generating controllable
counterfactuals in this task. In sum, contrary to the implicit
prediction of the preparatory hypothesis, participants who
were asked to give advice (to themselves or to other individ-
uals) produced a significantly higher rate of controllable coun-
terfactuals than participants who received no explicit instruc-
tion to this effect.
General discussion
In the reported studies, participants who had just completed a
task imagined a different outcome to their past attempt (coun-
terfactual condition) or to a following attempt (prefactual con-
dition). Compared to participants who had to think about a
different future, those who had to think about a different past
were more likely to mentally modify uncontrollable features
of their attempt. This tendency occurred both when partici-
pants had failed the task (BThings would have been better if
the allocated time were longer^) and when they had
successfully solved it (BThings would have been worse if the
allocated time were shorter^). This difference was observed
both when participants received mock (Study 1a) and veridi-
cal feedback on their past performance (Study 1b). In Study 2,
participants who generated counterfactuals in the standard
way without an explicit purpose produced fewer controllable
thoughts than those who were explicitly prompted to generate
counterfactuals that would be useful either to themselves or to
others. In the three studies, the effect sizes for comparisons
between counterfactual conditions and other conditions were
medium to large (ranging .38 to .68; see Coolican, 2014).
These results confirm and extend those obtained in earlier
studies (e.g., Ferrante et al., 2013; Girotto et al., 2007; Pighin
et al., 2011) and conflict with the predictions of the prepara-
tory hypothesis (e.g., Epstude & Roese, 2008, 2011;
Markman et al., 1993, Roese, 1997). If counterfactuals mainly
serve to prepare future performance, they should be of the
controllable sort, they should not differ from prefactuals, and
they should not be affected by external prompts. Contrary to
these predictions, our results show that unless participants are
explicitly prompted to generate useful thoughts, they often fail
to generate controllable counterfactuals. By contrast, they
spontaneously generate a significantly higher rate of
controllable prefactuals.
Recently, Epstude and Roese (2011) have refined the pre-
paratory function hypothesis by distinguishing between a
content-neutral pathway and a content-specific pathway. The
content-neutral pathway corresponds to a general increase of
motivation after the generation of counterfactual thoughts. It
would be very difficult to show that counterfactuals thoughts,
even uncontrollable ones, do not serve such a general func-
tion. By contrast, the content-specific pathway Bembodies the
transmission of particular semantic information from the
counterfactual to a behavioral intention to an action^
(Epstude & Roese, 2011, p. 21). Our results clearly argue
against this content-specific pathway, in particular because
our participants were in the ideal condition to generate con-
trollable hypothetical thoughts—that is, thoughts that would
fit with the definition of the content-specific pathway. First,
participants who think about the outcome of a scenario may be
uncertain about the elements that its characters might or might
not control. Yet they produce controllable counterfactuals
(e.g., Pighin et al., 2011). Our participants, however, complet-
ed the task themselves and thought about their own perfor-
mance. Therefore, they had direct experience of the elements
that were and were not under their control. Second, the partic-
ipants in our experiments completed a task whose outcome
largely depended on their attention and concentration level
and on the strategies they employed, instead of luck, for in-
stance. Despite these favorable conditions, our participants
generated a very low rate of controllable counterfactuals
(16 % across studies) and did so both when they reasoned
about a failure or about a success.
3 Because the design was not fully symmetrical (i.e., there was only one
prefactual condition), we could not perform a log-linear analysis.
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One potential criticism of our studies is that for participants
the stakes were relatively low. Participants stood to earn (or
fail to earn) only small rewards. However, in Experiment 1a,
participants were incentivized by the possibility of winning
photocopy cards. In fact, experiments offered in support of
the preparatory hypothesis have typically used low stakes.
Moreover, it is unclear why low stakes would particularly
affect the preparatory function and not all potential functions
of counterfactuals.
Indeed, several functions other than the preparatory one
have been suggested for counterfactual thoughts: BThey ex-
plain the past, prepare for the future, modulate emotional ex-
perience, and support moral judgments^ (Byrne, 2016, p.
136). The list of counterfactuals reported at the beginning of
the article might be used to illustrate some of these functions.
In the present case, one interpretation of the data is that many
of the counterfactuals generated by our participants could help
them to save face. Following a failure, individuals often ex-
plain it away (e.g., Gilovich, 1983; for a review, see Tavris &
Aronson, 2007). Accordingly, the typical counterfactuals pro-
duced by our participants (e.g., BThings would have been
better if the allocated time were longer^) could be considered
as potential excuses of their failure because they suggest that it
was due to factors outside of participants’ control. Such coun-
terfactuals would belong to the family of motivated reasoning:
reasoning that does not aim at accuracy, but at defending a
preestablished point of view (Kunda, 1990; Mercier &
Sperber, 2011). In the present case, the participants would be
defending their competence in the face of failure.
Following a failure, our participants modified uncontrolla-
ble features of their attempt. Uncontrollable counterfactuals,
however, are not the only sort of counterfactuals that can play
a self-defensive role. In our studies, we have used tasks that
did not involve any training or practice session. When tasks
involve such sessions, individuals who have experienced a
failure generate counterfactuals that do focus on their prepa-
ratory effort. For example, McCrea (2008) found that under-
graduates who had failed an exam and had reported a lack of
study effort tended to produce counterfactual thoughts about
studying (e.g., BIf I had studied more, I could have done
better^). Importantly, these undergraduates experienced an in-
crease in self-esteem as a result of generating such counterfac-
tuals, but a decrease in motivation to adequately prepare for
the next exam in the class. This finding shows that, along with
uncontrollable counterfactuals, controllable counterfactuals
can help save face following negative performance. This find-
ing also shows that counterfactuals, including controllable
ones, might have a detrimental effect on learning.
A series of studies by Petrocelli and colleagues (e.g.,
Petrocelli & Harris, 2011; Petrocelli, Seta, & Seta, 2013;
Petrocelli, Seta, Seta, & Prince, 2012; see also Kruger,
Wirtz, & Miller, 2005) confirmed this finding. For example,
students who generated counterfactuals about a failed item of
a multiple-choice practice exam (e.g., BIf I had read the answer
choices more thoroughly…^) were subsequently less likely to
study exam topics related to that item than exam topics related
to items for which they had not generated counterfactuals
(Petrocelli et al., 2012). In other words, counterfactuals, in-
cluding controllable ones, may provide an erroneous sense of
competence (e.g., BI mastered the topic but I did not read the
question carefully^), which in turn may hinder efforts toward
improvement. Results of this sort corroborate the view that
counterfactuals may improve future performance only to the
extent that they indicate the correct causal antecedent to the
negative outcome (e.g., lack of knowledge rather than a sim-
ple oversight of an item’s answers), and that individuals have
the ability and motivation to change their behavior in the di-
rection prescribed by counterfactual modifications (see
Petrocelli & Harris, 2011). Along with the strikingly low rate
of controllable counterfactuals reported in the present studies,
the finding that counterfactuals are often dysfunctional are
difficult to reconcile with the preparatory function hypothesis.
The reported tendencies indicate that future research should
pay more attention to the potential social functions of coun-
terfactual thought. In any case, it is important to bear in mind
that testing functional hypotheses takes more than demonstrat-
ing that a given cognitive mechanism (here, the mechanisms
that generate counterfactual thoughts) has a given effect (e.g.,
preparing for the future or explaining away the past). Any
adaptation is bound to have a multitude of effects as by-prod-
ucts, such as the noise our heart produces when beating.
Functional hypotheses must be supported instead by evidence
of a particularly good match between the hypothesized func-
tion of a mechanism and its working (see Williams, 1966: and
regarding functionalism in general, Elster, 1989). For in-
stance, more exigent tests of the functional hypothesis might
involve showing that engaging in counterfactual thought bet-
ter prepares individuals for future actions than other cognitive
activities would, or that the mechanisms that allow counter-
factual thought have features that are explained better by the
preparatory function hypothesis than by other functional hy-
potheses. Obviously, the hypothesis that counterfactuals serve
a social function would require the same type of evidence. At
the moment, no theory of counterfactual thought seems to
have enough arguments to support a functional hypothesis.
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